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THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE: "A CHARTER FOR A 
LIVING PEOPLE" 
Ralph Omant 
Mr. Oman has chosen the 200th anniversary of the adoption of the 
Constitution to deliver the following paean to the copyright clause. 
Set aside September 17, 1987, as a day for thoughtful celebration. 
On that day 200 years ago, the American people, acting through their 
representatives in Philadelphia, adopted the copyright and patent clause 
of the Constitution. That spare clause would advance as much as any 
other in the Constitution the noble purposes that resonate in the 
preamble: 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a 
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tran-
quillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general 
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and 
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
United States of America. 
Under this glorious banner, from the thirteen coastal toe-holds of 
European civilization that we'd carved out of the wilderness, we would 
launch the westward drive of a uniquely American civilization. We 
crossed mountains, bridged rivers, and marched through deserts to reach 
this Golden Gate on the Pacific, and we carried with us the protections 
of the Constitution. 
Our history explodes a myth - one that persists today in the devel-
oping world - that copyright, like the Episcopal Church, comes puffing 
and wheezing onto the scene only at the final stage of a country's devel-
opment. First, the story goes, the people have to clear the land and build 
the muscle and sinew of industry. Only then do they turn to life's finer 
frills and build opera houses, compose music, paint pictures, write po-
etry, and, at last, start thinking about copyright laws. 
In the United States, we made copyright a part of the organic law of 
the land, and it has been with us every step of the way. In many ways, 
copyright helped us conquer the vast tracts and people the interior. 
Books, newspapers, engravings, maps and charts fired the imagination of 
the pioneers and gave them courage. They read the diaries of the path-
finders; they saw the engravings of Audubon; they plotted their journey 
overland on the maps of Lewis and Clark; they navigated around the 
t Register of Copyrights; B.A., 1962, Hamilton College; J.D., 1973, Georgetown Uni-
versity. This speech was delivered at the ABA convention in San Francisco, Cali-
fornia on August 10, 1987. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of 
Elliott Alderman, Senior Attorney in the Office of the General Counsel, Copyright 
Office, for his help in researching a portion of the technical core of this speech. 
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Hom on the charts of Yankee sea captains. Once they reached their 
promised land, "how-to" books on popular mechanics and science sup-
plemented their own ingenuity and taught them how to tame the land, 
nurse the sick, and give some comfort to their families, and textbooks for 
their schools educated their children. . 
In that perilous 200 year journey we have grown from an economic 
and cultural backwater to an economic powerhouse and the world's lead-
ing creator and exporter of scientific and popular culture. Tens of 
thousands of authors have bloomed in the strong sun of the copyright 
clause, to the greater joy of us all. 
Of course, the copyright clause protects not only works of fiction 
and the imagination. As I mentioned, the first Copyright Act of 1790 
protected some very useful items: school textbooks, maps and charts, 
and books on science, agriculture and medicine. So in this survey I strike 
two themes- first, that in many important ways the copyright clause 
helped us build a great nation out of the wilderness, and second, that, 
like the Constitution itself, the copyright clause has changed and ex-
panded as our country changed and expanded from a small, agrarian 
nation to a high-tech, industrial workhorse. I begin my overview with 
the colonial experience. 
But, first, I apologize. I alone have no slides. How to explain? Just 
before the Cuban missle crisis broke into the headlines, back in 1962, 
President Kennedy sent Dean Acheson to Paris on a secret mission to try 
to convince Charles de Gaulle to support the United States blockade. 
Under cover of darkness, Acheson was driven into a basement garage at 
the Elysee Palace. With a portfolio of photographs under his arm, he 
was led up a dimly-lit, winding stone staircase into de Gaulle's private 
study. De Gaulle was seated behind his desk and after a respectful wel-
come and exchange of pleasantries, Acheson laid all the photographs of 
the missle emplacements out on de Gaulle's desk. With a sweep of his 
arm, de Gaulle brushed them aside and said "Great powers do not need 
photographs." Well, I wanted to say that the Copyright Office does not 
need photographs, but I expect that someone will come up to me after 
my talk and say "Ralph, you should have had photographs." 
Let me begin my unillustrated journey. I will follow the sage advice 
that Dorothy got in the Wizard of Oz. "It is always best to begin at the 
beginning. " 
We all know that the English Statute of Anne l was the first pub-
lished copyright statute. It required the consent of authors and proprie-
tors for the publication of their books and other writings. It gave authors 
a fourteen year term of copyright protection and a fourteen year renewal 
term. 
The statute of Anne, at a time when relations were strained between 
England and the Colonies, gave marginal protection to American au-
1. 8 Anne ch. 19 (1709). 
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thors. It could take more than the fourteen year term of protection to 
travel to London to register a work at Stationer's Hall or to exercise your 
appeal rights before the Archbishop of Canterbury. Let me use music as 
an example. 
At first, Colonial music was purely imitative. The great majority of 
works produced consisted of collections and editions of English hymns. 
A few of them are notable for their historic value - "The Bay Psalm 
Book," was the first book to be printed in the colonies, 1640, and the 
"Collection of Psalm Tunes" by Josiah Flagg, was notable because it was 
the first book printed on paper made in the colonies, and also because the 
engravings were done by Paul Revere (1764). 
The composer who declared American Musical Independence was 
William Billings of Boston. He did to English church music what Walt 
Whitman did to poetry. His rugged, inspiring music was a rallying cry 
around campfires, in homes, in churches alike. Let me quote a few lines 
of "Chester" so you can see why his hymns were so popular. 
Let tyrants shake their ironrod/ And slav'ry clank her galling 
chainslWe fear them not we trust in god/New england's god 
forever reigns. 
His music had a virile, sonorous and natural quality not weighed down 
by formal rules of composition. He was a self-taught man, a tanner by 
trade, and he was the most prolific and popular composer of Colonial 
times. 
Billings was also the first American author to seek legal protection 
for his work. He petitioned the Massachusetts House of Representatives 
shortly before he published "The New England Psalm Singer" in 1770. 
The House considered his bill almost immediately, but no action was 
taken. Billings revived his petition in 1772, this time with greater ur-
gency. By this time, Billings' reputation had become established, and he 
offered to appear in person before the Committee if anyone doubted his 
authorship. 
After hearing his prediction of impending harm (written with the 
help of his friend Samuel Adams, Speaker of the Massachusetts House), 
both Houses passed a private copyright bill protecting his works for 
seven years. Anyone publishing, vending or bartering Billings' works 
under this bill was subject to a ten pound fine for each offense. Unfortu-
nately, he got caught in a political whipsaw. The same influence that 
prompted speedy action on his bill in the nationalistic Massachusetts 
Congress made it suspect in the eyes of the Governor, Thomas Hutchin-
son, a staunch Loyalist. He was locked in a life and death struggle with 
the Massachusetts legislature, and Samuel Adams, Billings' friend, was a 
leader of the patriots. So the Governor vetoed the bill. Billings' third 
petition, in 1778, fared badly also, and he did not attempt to secure copy-
right protection further. By then, he was the most popular composer in 
the colonies, by then in the middle of the War for Independence. 
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Billings was not known for his humility. He shunned musical edu-
cation in favor of inspiration, saying "Art is subservient to genius." His-
tory also tells us that a wag once wrote Billings and asked if Billings 
could answer a tough question on music. Billings wrote back, "Whatever 
·your question may be, I pledge myself to answer it, as there is nothing 
connected with the Science that I have not mastered." When they met at 
Lamb's Tavern in Boston at the appointed time, the gentlemen said "The 
question is one which affects the whole world, and has never been set-
tled." "Let me hear it!" said Billings. "Well it is this: When a man snores 
in his sleep through at least two octaves, and so loud as to be heard 
throughout the whole house, do you consider these sounds vocal or in-
strumental music?" Billings' response has not been preserved. But 
whether or not it is copyrightable is another tough question. 
After the war, Billings finally won some copyright protection. In 
1783, under the Articles of Confederation, the Massachusetts legislature 
passed a copyright act, giving authors protection for 21 years and provid-
ing penalties up to $3,000. Copyright was granted to a work upon de-
posit of two copies in the Harvard College Library. So, in 1786, Billings 
was finally able to get a copyright. 
Although the Massachusetts Act provided for reciprocity between 
states, the lack of a federal copyright made his protection next to worth-
less. Wholesale copying of his works went on in neighboring states. By 
1790, when the federal statute was passed, it was too late for Billings and 
his family of nine. Despite heavy advertising and several benefit con-
certs, Billings fell on hard times. His best works were already out and 
everyone knew them by heart. His meteoric rise was equalled only by his 
rapid fall. A year after writing his last work, a hymn on the death of 
George Washington, Billings died, in poverty. 
So in the United States, copyright got off to a slow start. The Arti-
cles of Confederation did not have a copyright clause. It relied instead 
on a recommendation by the Continental Congress that states provide 
their own copyright protection.2 Twelve states - all except Delaware-
passed copyright laws prior to the Constitutional Convention: eight 
states protected writings in the literal sense; four protected books and 
pamphlets. Three states gave protection for maps and charts as well as 
books. Two statutes did not use the word "writings," so the extension to 
maps and charts couldn't be implied. The statutes had no effect outside 
the territorial jurisdiction of particular states, and the lack of national 
uniform copyright protection did great harm to authors like Billings. It 
gave the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia a great incentive to 
write in a federal copyright provision. 3 
Because Congress approved the final version of the copyright clause 
2. 24 JOURNALS, CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 326-27 (1783). 
3. Committee on Judiciary SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COpy-
RIGHTS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDY No.4, THE 
MEANING OF "WRITINGS" IN THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 69 
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without debate in a secret proceeding, the breadth of the term "writings" 
is not clear.4 During the Convention, four clauses were suggested, but 
none contained the term "writings." Professor Derenberg drew two pos-
sible conclusions from the fact that the final version contains only the 
term "writings": first, that Congress used the word as a limitation upon 
the broad scope of all the possible proposals; or second, that the Commit-
tee on Style preferred the sound of the word, that the change was one of 
style, not substance. 
In The Federalist, James Madison noted that "an author's copyright 
was granted at common law in Great Britain, but that the states in the 
new nation were ineffectual in providing similar protection."s 
Madison wanted to harmonize federal and common law copyright 
protection.6 The clause does not define the scope of protection, but, in-
stead it suggests that Congress can expand the common law to protect 
whatever it wants.7 Likewise, the clause is not intended to deal with 
subjects of copyright but to assure uniform protection through nation-
wide laws,8 and Congress may expand the scope of the clause by chang-
ing the common law by statute. It has even been argued that the 
copyright clause was intended only as a limitation on the perpetual copy-
right (at least for the life of the author) granted at common law.9 The 
counter to this argument is that use of the term "author" in relation to 
"writing" demonstrates that statutory protection is limited to written 
matter. lo This is so because written matter was the only thing in exist-
ence at the time and it is the literal and common sense meaning of the 
term. II Professor Derenberg could find no direct evidence on the intent 
of the clause. 12 
The legislative histories to the various copyright acts from 1790 to 
the present similarly do not shed any light on the scope of the clause. 
The House Report to the 1976 Act says that the scope of "writings" 
under the 1909 and 1976 Acts is narrower than the range of constitu-
tional authority, but does not delineate the breadth of the term. 13 
The experts have settled on three theories as to the development of 
present statutory copyright protection. 14 The first is that the term "writ-
ings" in the copyright clause refers literally to books and periodicals -
(Comm. Print 1961) (reprinted in 1 FISCHER'S STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 43» [here-
inafter REVISION STUDY)' 
4. Id. at 70. 
5. The Federalist, No. 43, at 278 (Modern Library ed. 1937). 
6. REVISION STUDY, supra note 3, at 70. 
7.Id. 
8. Id. (citation omitted). 
9. 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 486 (1953). 
10. REVISION STUDY, supra note 3, at 71. 
11. Id. 
12.Id. 
13. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976) [hereinafter the "1976 
HOUSE REPORT")' 
14. REVISION STUDY, supra note 3, at 71-72. 
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"words written in a form intelligible to all who can read."15 Congress in 
its reports does not recognize this construction, and all acts from 1790 to 
the present have gone beyond this narrow definition. The second is that 
the clause reflects the desire to protect the commercial value of the fruits 
of intellectual labor. 16 Under this reading, all intellectual property capa-
ble of extensive reproduction is protected, and the clause may be ex-
panded to include these works, like music and engravingsP This theory 
views the Constitution as a living document, and the term "writings" 
expands with technological progress. IS If the document is living, so are 
its component parts. 19 The third and final theory is that the first part of 
the clause defines the entire clause, so that whatever promotes science 
and useful arts falls within the definition of "writings."2o 
In fact, the courts have only rarely been called upon to construe the 
patent and copyright clause, so we have little judicial gloss on its 
meaning. 2 I 
The introductory phrase, "to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts," is mainly explanatory of the purpose of copyright. It sug-
gests, at most, certain minimal elements to be contained in copyright 
legislation.22 But the experts disagree on whether the term "science" re-
fers to the work of authors and "useful arts" to the product of inventors, 
or vice-versa.23 
Richard C. DeWolf, the Acting Register of Copyrights during 
World War II, first proposed a strictly disjunctive interpretation of the 
clause. 
He divided the Clause into two distinct propostions: first, Congress 
shall have power to promote the progress of science by securing to au-
thors the exclusive right to their writings and, second, Congress shall 
have the power to promote the progress of the useful arts by securing to 
inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries. The first proposition 
contains authority for copyright legislation, the second for patent 
legislation. 
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the word "science" 
meant learning in general, while the term "useful arts" referred to arts 
that were used in manufacture or the design of machinery. 
Whatever the case, we all agree that Congress acted, not simply to 
15. [d. at 71. 
16. [d. at 71-72. 
17. [d. at 72. 
18. [d. at 72 n.45. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. at 72. 
21. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 1.02 (1987). 
22. /d. § 1.03. 
23. Compare Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) ("useful 
arts" are subject of copyright legislation under Constitution) with Graham v. John 
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) ("useful arts" applies to patents). 
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reward the author,24 but to benefit the public.25 In 1954, the Supreme 
Court in Mazer v. Stein 26 said that "[t]he economic philosophy behind 
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the 
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the 
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and 
inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' "27 The copyright law provides 
this incentive "by granting a right to exclude others from certain uses of 
the copyrighted work."28 So copyright protection is based on the dual 
premise of protecting authors' works and the interest of the public in the 
widespread dissemination of information. 
The courts have held that the phrase "to promote" is the same as 
the terms "to stimulate," "to encourage," and "to induce,"29 but the en-
tire phrase "To promote the progress of science and useful arts ... " must 
be read as a preamble indicating the purpose of the power, not as a limita-
tion on its exercise. 30 
In fact, the introductory phrase has tended to expand rather than 
limit Congressional authority.31 Since the drafters joined the phrase 
"promote the progress" with the term "writings," we should not confine 
the latter to a narrow definition.32 The promotion of progress requires a 
broad construction of the clause. Congress should look at several factors 
before expanding copyright protection: the nature of a new technology, 
the asserted interests justifying protection, and the constitutional and so-
cietal significance of interests adversely affected by protection.33 The in-
troductory phrase - as expressive of the purpose of copyright - could 
in some ways clarify the meaning of otherwise ambiguous statutory 
provisions. 34 
The significance of the term "by securing" was decided in Wheaton 
v. Peters,35 but is mostly only of historical significance now. 36 In Whea-
ton, the Supreme Court held that the term referred to the securing of a 
future, rather than an existing, right. 
However, the phrase "by securing for limited times" is a very real 
24. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
25. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
26. 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
27. [d. at 219. 
28. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of 
Expression 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 285 (1979). 
29. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
30. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670 (Ct. Cl.), rev'd on other 
grounds, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 
420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
31. Ladd v. Law & Technology Press, 762 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1985); Schnapper v. 
Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
32. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 1.03[B] at 1-32.3. 
33. Richards, The Value of the Copyright Clause in Construction of Copyright Law, 2 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 21, 226-27 (1975). 
34. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
35. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
36. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 1.04 at 1-33. 
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limitation on congressional power. For a federal copyright statute to 
grant perpetual protection, for example, would be unconstitutional. 37 
But within very broad limits, the period of protection is discretionary 
with Congress. 38 
In Graham v. John Deere Co., 39 the Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional, under the 1976 Act, the extension of protection to works previ-
ously protected by copyright. Professor Nimmer agreed that the 
extension of the term of protection for a work already protected by copy-
right would probably exceed Congressional power under the copyright 
clause as well as the first amendment. 40 
Professor Nimmer says the provision strikes a balance between the 
competing interests of authors in protecting their efforts and the public in 
having access to information essential to the development of society.41 
The essence of authorship is originality. In the words of the Court, 
the author is "he [or she] to whom anything owes its origin .... "42 So 
one must create, rather than copy from another, to be an author.43 The 
originality must involve some intellectual labor to be the product of an 
author,44 but the labor need be only minimal.45 
Let me give you some minimalist examples. Elbert Hubbard pub-
lished his profound Essay on Silence in 1898. It consisted only of blank 
pages. He never received widespread acclaim, or sales, for his deeply in-
scrutable book. In 1974 Bruce Harris registered for copyright The Noth-
ing Book. Apparently, the Cleveland Press reviewed the book with a four 
inch by eight inch blank space. The New York Times said, simply, "We 
have nothing to add." The Philadelphia Bulletin called the book "a 
profound masterpiece." The only bad news for Mr. Harris came when 
the Belgian publishers of a blank book called The Memoirs of an Amne-
siac sued him for plagiarism. Mr. Harris beat a hasty retreat and coun-
tered that blankness is in the public domain. So, no copyright 
infringement. He won. 
Also, uncopyrightable under the minimalist standard would be Sa-
muel Beckett's play Breath, written in 1970. It is only 30 seconds long, 
and has no words and no actors. Normally Beckett wrote in french, but 
whether he did so in Breath is unclear. As that renowned copyright law-
37. See Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156; Marx v. United States, 96 F.2d 
204 (9th Cir. 1938). 
38. See Pennock & Sellers v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 11, 16 (1829). 
39. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
40. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 1.05 [A] at 1-34 to 1-35. 
41. [d. § 1.05[0] at 1-36. 
42. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
43. Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Florida, Inc., 753 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1985); L. 
Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976). 
44. International News Servo V. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
45. Bleistein V. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
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yer, Fulton Brylawski Senior, said many years ago, "I didn't say it wasn't 
art; I just said it wasn't copyrightable." 
Originality is different from intellectual labor: the former stems 
from the copyright clause's use of the term "authors" and refers to in-
dependent creation,46 while the latter suggests an absolute, although min-
imal, standard of creativity.47 Intellectual labor, for example, includes 
"[nlon-objective art, stream of consciousness writing, poetry consisting of 
meaningless but aesthetically pleasing sounds, and coined or code words 
without established meanings .... "48 
The phrase "exclusive right" provides constitutional authority for 
Congress to grant to authors property rights to the fruits of their intellec-
tuallabors. But, the Congress has whittled away at the exclusivity of the 
right. Both the 1909 Act and, with a vengence, the 1976 Act, provide for 
broad compulsory licenses. The copyright owners lose exclusivity under 
these laws because they must grant licenses to users who comply with the 
statutory requirements for the license.49 
Professor Nimmer justifies this apparent inconsistency as a middle 
ground that Congress has steered within its discretion under the copy-
right clause. The Constitution gives Congress the authority, but does not 
require it, to enact copyright legislation in the first instance and to deter-
mine its scope. So a compromise between copyright owners and users is 
a reasonable accommodation of competing interests. The phrase "the 
exclusive right" indicates words of authority, but not limitation.50 
At least until the 1930's legal opinion remained unsettled as to 
whether the single compulsory license - the mechanical recording li-
cense - of the 1909 Act was constitutional. In fact, the drafters of that 
compulsory license were careful to provide that the right to record is 
exclusive - that is until the copyright owner authorizes or makes a re-
cording. Only then does the right become non-exclusive. No litigant se-
riously challenged the constitutionality of the mechanical music 
compulsory license. It was modified and re-enacted in the 1976 Act, 
along with three new compulsory licenses. Again, no one has challenged 
their constitutionality in court, even though the three new licenses do not 
even adopt the fiction that the right is exclusive until exercised. 
The term "writing" has been construed broadly, and not accorded 
the literal definition of a layperson. 51 In fact, if every copyright law 
passed since 1790 were read literally they would all be partially invali-
dated, and works such as photographs, motion pictures, paintings, and 
cartoons would not be extended protection. 52 
46. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 1.06[A] at 1-37 to 1-38. 
47.Id. 
48. Id. at 1-49. 
49. See generally id. § 1.07 at 1-42 to 1-43. 
50. Id. (citations omitted). 
51. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967). 
52. REVISION STUDY, supra note 3, at 67. 
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Judge Learned Hand made the classic statement on the scope of the 
copyright clause: in denying that the "constitution embalms inflexibly 
the habits of 1789," he said that 
Its grants of power to Congress comprise, not only what was 
then known, but what the ingenuity of men should devise, 
thereafter. Of course, the new subject-matter must have some 
relation to the grant; but we interpret it by the general practices 
of civilized peoples in similar fields, for it is not a strait-jacket, 
but a charter for a living people. 53 
For almost a century the Supreme Court did not directly question 
the general scope of the clause. Finally, in 1973, in Goldstein v. Califor-
nia,54 it held that "writings ... include any physical renderings of the 
fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor."55 So a work constitutes 
a writing if it contains some intellectual labor, is embodied in tangible 
form, and is perceptible to any of the five senses. 56 
In the 1909 Act, "all the writings of an author" were protected. 57 
The legislative history to that Act states only that the clause is "declara-
tory of existing law,"58 but does not indicate the scope of copyright 
protection. 
The legislative history to the 1976 Act59 establishes, though, that 
Congress did not intend to exhaust the scope of constitutional power.60 
In the 1976 Act, the term "writings" includes "any fixation of a work in 
tangible form,"61 and does not limit copyright protection to existing 
technology or to forms of expression presently deemed worthy of 
protection.62 
Before a landmark 1903 Supreme Court decision, the courts held 
that materials designed only for advertising, regardless of their form, 
were not copyrightable.63 In Bleistein, the Supreme Court held that 
chromolithographs representing actual persons and things designed as 
posters to advertise a circus were copyrightable as pictorial illustrations. 
Justice Holmes wrote for the majority and analyzed the question of 
53. Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
54. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). 
55.Id. 
56. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 1.08[B] at 1-47. 
57. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1076, 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1928) (amended 
1982). 
58. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1909) [hereinafter "1909 HOUSE 
REPORT"]. 
59. 17 U.S.c. § 101-810 (1976). 
60. See 1976 HOUSE REPORT supra note 13, at 51. 
61. Note, Toward a Constitutional Theory of Expression: The Copyright Clause. the First 
Amendment. and Protection of Individual Creativity, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1043, 
1045 n.5 (1980). 
62. See 1976 HOUSE REPORT supra note 13, at 51. 
63. Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 431 (1891) (label on ink bottle denied protection 
because it served no purpose "other than as a mere advertisement or designation of 
the subject to which it is attached.") 
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whether the work was indeed a "writing" in terms of originality and au-
thorship. Advertisements are not writings in the literal sense, and are 
only considered so because of the original thought or labor entailed in 
their creation.64 
Photographs were first protected in 1865, around the time of the 
invention of modem photography,6S and the Supreme Court ruled in 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,66 that the copyright law pro-
tected photographs embodying the photographer's artistic conception. 
The photograph in question, a poetic rendering of Oscar Wilde, was pro-
tected on the basis of originality in the selection and arrangement of cos-
tumes, other accessories, the subject of the photograph, and deployment 
of light and shade.67 
Prior to the Act of 1912,68 motion pictures were registered as photo-
graphs. Thomas Edison sought copyright in a series of 4,500 pictures 
showing the launching of Kaiser Wilhelm's yacht. In protecting the mo-
tion picture as a photograph, the court reasoned that Congress in passing 
the 1865 Act anticipated technological advancements in photography, as 
in other cases, and that motion pictures were one such advancement.69 
The court also found that Edison's work had enough creativity and origi-
nality in that the motion picture embodied artistic conception and ex-
pression and required a study of lights, shadows, and general 
surroundings.70 
Motion pictures and photographs are considered copyrightable be-
cause their production "requires the arranging, selecting, and utilizing of 
light, shadows, general surroundings, and vantage point to secure the 
entire effect."7! Dramatic motion pictures also are protected for the 
same reasons as dramas: they relate a story by means of plot, incident, 
dialogue, and character development. 
Paintings were not included by the congressional framers in the 
original copyright law. This omission probably occurred because exten-
sive reproduction and copying of paintings was not possible then and it 
was believed that common law protection was adequate. Also hand-
copying does not produce an exact copy, and the need for statutory pro-
tection did not arise until the advent of new methods of reproduction, 
such as photography and lithographs.72 As with other media that are not 
literally "writings," the analysis of copyrightability focused on the pres-
ence of originality and creativity.73 
64. REVISION STUDY supra note 3, at 94. 
65. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540. 
66. III U.S. 53 (1884). 
67. [d. at 60. 
68. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488. 
69. Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240, 242 (3d Cir. 1903). 
70. [d. 
71. REVISION STUDY supra note 3, at 95. 
72. ld. at 96. 
73. [d. 
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In the seminal case, American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister,74 the 
Supreme Court simply assumed the copyrightability of paintings. In a 
1951 case, the Second Circuit implied further that a hand-copied paint-
ing would always involve some variation entitling the subsequent picture 
to copyright. 7S 
Maps have been protected since the first U.S. copyright statute.76 
Their copyrightability, since mapmakers inevitably use preexisting works 
of others, is based on original labor consisting of "selection, arrangement, 
and presentation of component parts. "77 But the collation of features 
from earlier maps is not sufficiently original, unless there is independent 
effort on the part of the creator,18 
Characters are most readily protectible where the original and the 
copied work consist of graphic rather than word ·representations.79 Once 
protected, a cartoon character are [sic] protected by reproduction in an-
other medium.80 Court cases assume that cartoons - even without 
words or a connected story - are protectible "writings," and the form 
and concept of humor are the essential creative thought and labor that 
warrant copyright protection. 81 
The protection of three-dimensional objects pushes the boundaries 
of copyright protection to its out limits, and we can constitutionally jus-
tify protection only on a copyright-principles rather than form analysis 
of the terms "writings" and "authors."82 Courts granting protection to 
these objects generally assume their copyrightability, although the issue 
of protecting three-dimensional objects as "writings" was raised but not 
addressed in Mazer v. Stein. 83 In Mazer, the Supreme Court extended 
protection to the artistic elements of a statuette shaped as a female Bali-
nese dancer used as a lamp base. 
Since that landmark case, courts have granted copyright protection 
to stuffed toy bears,84 fabric designs,8S decorative belt buckles,86 and toy 
airplanes. 87 For protection of the artistic features of a three-diminsional 
useful article, an author must contribute some originality to distinguish it 
74. 207 U.S. 284 (1907). 
75. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951). 
76. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
77. General Drafting Co. v. Andrews, 37 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir. 1930). 
78. Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 189 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1951). 
79. Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983). 
80. Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934); 
King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924). 
81. REVISION STUDY, supra note 3, at 97-98. 
82. Id. at 98-101. 
83. 347 U.S. 201, 206 n. 5 (1954). 
84. American Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983). 
85. Hedaya Bros., Inc. v. Capital Plastics, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D. N.Y. 1980). 
86. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980). 
87. Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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from prior art,88 and the artistic elements must be conceptually separable 
from any utilitarian function of the article. 
The copyright law has protected musical compositions since 1831.89 
Viewed as notations on sheet music, it is not conceptually difficult to 
conceive of them as "writings." However, unlike literary works, the ar-
rangement of musical sounds rather than the notations are the essence of 
musical compositions.90 Early on, sound recordings were not protected 
as copyrightable subject matter because the Supreme Court held in 1908 
in the White-Smith case that a piano roll was not a copy of the underly-
ing musical composition. Although the decision dealt with the term 
"copy" as applied to musical works, it came to be accepted for the gen-
eral principle that the term "copy" under the 1909 Act required visibly 
perceptible reproductions. The corollary to this principle was that if 
something was not capable of reproduction in visually perceptible form, 
it could not constitute copyrightable subject matter under the 1909 Act. 
The year after the White-Smith decision, Congress gave the com-
poser the right, subject to a compulsory license, to reproduce or to li-
cense others to reproduce the composition on phonorecords, but did not 
otherwise reverse White-Smith until the 1976 Act. But the courts later 
. retreated from the position that a "writing" required visible expression, 
and in Goldstein v. California, the Supreme Court held that sound re-
. cordings constitute "writings" under the Constitution.91 
Computer programs and databases are examples of a relatively new 
technology protected under the 1976 Act as "literary works." The 1976 
House Report states that computer programs and databases are "literary 
works" to the "extent that they incorporate authorship in the program-
mer's expression of original ideas."92 With the passage of the Computer 
Software Copyright Act of 1980,93 there was no longer any doubt that 
computer programs were protected. The 1980 Act also added a defini-
tion of the term "computer program" tei section 101. But we have yet to 
see a computer programmer get the Nobel Prize for Literature. 
The courts have also said that computer programs are works of au-
thorship protected by copyright94 whether they are in human-readable 
source code or machine-readable object code.95 To reach this conclusion, 
the courts once more assumed that a new technology, by no stretch of the 
imagination a literal "writing," was protected under the Constitution. 
The courts have also accepted databases as copyrightable subject 
matter, generally on the ground that they are "compilations" within the 
88. REVISION STUDY, supra note 3, at 100. 
89. Act of Feb. 3,1831, ch. 16, § 1,4 Stat. 436. 
90. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). 
91. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
92. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 54. 
93. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3018 (1980). 
94. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). 
95. Williams Elec. Inc. v. Artie Int'I, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982). 
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meaning of section 101 of the Act. Again, they expanded the Constitu-
tion to protect subject matter that exists primarily in ephemeral, elec-
tronic form, and may be more or less constantly revised, updated, or 
otherwise changed, never really "fixed." The statute requires fixation in 
a tangible form, but the courts have just ignored that requirement. 
Finally, in 1984 Congress could be pushed no further and created a 
new form of intellectual property protection for "mask works" fixed in 
semiconductor chip products. Does this sui generis form of protection 
signal the end of the expansion of the copyright clause of the Constitu-
tion? Chairman Kastenmeier, of the House Copyright Subcommittee, 
has dropped several very broad hints that suggest he will look at sui 
generis protection for a long list of new technologies - artificial intelli-
gence, molecular and genetic engineering, information processing, com-
puter software, and telecommunications. Some early proposals for mask 
work protection, although not enacted, were predicated on the commerce 
clause as well as the patent-copyright clause. Obviously, many propo-
nents found the patent-copyright clause a shaky premise for chip protec-
tion. Mr. Kastenmeier quoted John Hersey in stating Congress' desire to 
avoid "distortion by shoehorn." Congress probably put those qualms to 
rest by striking a new course, not bound by established precedents. But. 
the new technologies will continue to challenge Congress and the courts, 
and continue to test the flexibility of the patent-copyright clause. Are 
human-created life forms copyrightable? The patent law has waded 
chest-deep into that Serbonian bog. Having absorbed computer pro-
grams, databases, and semiconductor chip products under either the 
copyright law or copyright-like principles, perhaps we should leave life-
forms to the patent side of the clause. 
Three years ago, at a symposium on copyright and new technolo-
gies, Senator Mathias likened Congress to Balboa, who had climbed the 
slopes of the Isthmus of Panama from the Caribbean side. From the 
summit, spread out before him, he saw the vast southern sea. In the 
words of Keats: 
He stared at the Pacific 
And all his men 
Looked at each other with a wild surmise 
Silent upon a peak in Darien.96 
Balboa didn't know what great sea he was looking at, and didn't know 
what distant shores it washed, but he was aware that he had made a 
momentous discovery. 
So, when September 17th, 1987, dawns, think about the copyright 
and patent clause. And think about Balboa, silent on that peak in Da-
rien. We look out across a sea of new technologies of unknown dimen-
sion. The copyright and patent clause has served us well, and it will 
96. J. KEATS, SELECTED POETRY AND LETTERS 6 (1969). 
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guide the new Balboas - the new pioneers - the new discoverers -
who will lead this country into the unknown of the 21st century. We 
hope that our example will inspire them, and inspire our friends in the 
developing world, and convince them that social and economic progress 
and strong intellectual property protection go hand-in-hand. 
With the Constitution under our arm, we have traveled through two 
hundred years of history, and the clause has dogged our every step, 
changing as we changed. And it will dog us for another two hundred 
years, as "the charter of a living people." 
